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Post-Trial Plea Bargaining in Capital
Cases: Using Conditional Clemency to
Remove Weak Cases from Death Row
Adam M. Gershowitz ∗
Abstract
Plea bargaining accounts for over ninety percent of
criminal convictions and it dominates the American criminal
justice system. Yet, once a defendant is convicted, bargaining
almost completely disappears from the system. Even though
years of litigation are on the horizon, there is nearly no
bargaining in the appellate and habeas corpus process. There
are two reasons for this. First, prosecutors and courts typically
lack the power to alter a sentence that has already been
imposed. Second, even if prosecutors had the authority to
negotiate following a conviction, they would have little incentive
to do so. Affirmance rates in ordinary criminal cases approach
ninety-five percent in many jurisdictions. Because the
government has little incentive to bargain, defendants slowly
churn their way through the formal appellate and habeas
process.
The lack of post-trial bargaining makes perfect sense in
ordinary criminal cases. It does not make as much sense in
death-penalty cases, however. Death sentences are followed by
decades of litigation. And, more importantly, challenges to
death sentences are often successful. Capital cases are reversed
at alarming rates, and re-trials typically follow the reversals.
Faced with years of appellate litigation that it might not win,
and the prospect of a re-trial and another slew of appeals, the
State should have an incentive to bargain in its weakest cases.
∗ Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of
Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to Elizabeth Rademacher for
helpful research assistance.
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And the convicted individualfaced with a death
sentencelikely has an even stronger incentive to bargain.
This Article argues that governors should not simply think
about clemency as a tool to prevent morally questionable
executions. Rather, governors should regularly exercise their
commutation power as a form of plea bargaining to clear weak
cases out of the system. In exchange for inmates foregoing
further appeals, governors could commute death sentences to
terms of imprisonment. Clemency bargaining fits squarely
within governors’ unreviewable commutation power and would
save tens of millions of dollars by ending decades of unruly
litigation.
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I. Introduction
There are roughly 3,000 inmates on death row in the United
States. 1 The number has declined slightly in recent
1. See Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. INFORMATION
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-rowyear?scid=9&did=188#year (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (tracking the United States death
row population from 1968–2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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years, 2 but by and large the size of death row has remained the
same for two decades. 3 The reason for the backlog is obvious:
juries sentence defendants to death, but executions are not
carried out until, on average, fifteen years later. 4 Furthermore,
executions are the exception. Inmates primarily leave death row
not because they were executed, but because of successful
appeals. 5 Indeed, the appellate process is so long and burdensome
that hundreds of death-row inmates have died of natural causes
before being executed. 6 Unlike during the first half of the
twentieth century, 7 inmates rarely leave death row because a
governor or pardon board has studied the case and decided to
grant clemency. The numbers are staggering. Since the
reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976, over 3,000 death
sentences have been reversed by courts, 8 nearly 1,500 people
have been executed, 9 and more than 400 inmates have died while
awaiting their executions. Despite these staggering figures, there

2. At its height, there were almost 3,600 people on death row in the United
States. Id.
3. Id.
4. For instance, the average time from death sentence to execution for the
inmates executed in 2013 was 186 months—over fifteen and a half years. See
TRACEY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013:
Statistical Tables, Tbl. 10, 14 (Dec. 2014) (charting by year the average time
between sentencing and execution). In 2011, it was sixteen and a half years. Id.
5. See id. at 19 (indicating that as of 2013, 194 inmates had their
convictions or sentences reversed in contrast to 1,359 executions).
6. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT—2009 Tbl. 20
(Dec. 2010) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATISTICS] (identifying 416
people who left death row because of a non-execution death from 1973 to 2009).
7. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 266 (1990–91) (noting clemency in
one of five capital cases).
8. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATISTICS, supra note 6 (detailing death row
statistics).
9. See Number of Executions Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year (last
visited Sept. 7, 2016) (referencing a high of ninety-eight people executed in
1999) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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have been less than seventy individualized grants 10 of clemency. 11
A system in which the government spends decades fighting to
protect thousands of death sentences to see only a fraction of
them carried out is inefficient. And that inefficiency is very
expensive. States are spending millions of dollars litigating
capital cases that do not end in executions. 12 There are, of course,
approaches that could lead to a more efficient capital punishment
system. Courts could affirm more death sentences. Judges could
process appeals and habeas petitions more quickly. 13 States could
abolish capital punishment altogether and allow death rows to
empty out through a combination of a few executions, some
reversals, and inmates dying of natural causes. 14 Similarly,
juries could simply stop sentencing inmates to death. Or
10. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital Clemency,
113 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) [hereinafter Rethinking the Timing] (advocating
for a “threshold clemency determination” that occurs earlier in the criminal
justice process).
11. There have been a handful of mass commutations in which governors
emptied death row as they exited office. See Michael Heise, The Death of Death
Row Clemency and the Evolving Politics of Unequal Grace, 66 ALA. L. REV. 949,
963 (2015) (“[C]lemency activity for death row inmates—never terribly notable
since 1977—has remained flat, at best, or trended down slightly, save for
explainable ‘spikes’ associated with mass clemency activity.”).
12. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties
Should Be Required To Post a Bond to Seek the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L.
REV. 861, 890–91 (2007) [hereinafter Pay Now, Execute Later] (discussing
estimates that “large states such as California and Florida could save tens of
millions of dollars per year by eliminating capital punishment”);
see
also
Carol Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 117, 121
(discussing how New Jersey abandoned the death penalty in part because they
were not actually executing anyone on death row and were spending a
considerable amount of money on appeals).
13. This was part of the impetus for the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act. See Lyn Entzeroth, Federal Habeas Review of Death Sentences,
Where Are We Now?: A Review of Wiggins v. Smith and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 39
TULSA L. REV. 49, 52 (2003) (quoting President Clinton saying “[f]or too long,
and in too many cases, endless death row appeals have stood in the way of
justice being served”).
14. This has happened in some states. Between 2005 and 2012, five states
abolished the death penalty. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Virtues of Thinking
Small, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397, 408 (2013) (noting that the cost of the death
penalty plays “a critical role in the decision to abandon capital punishment as
the ultimate sanction”).
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prosecutors could choose to seek the death penalty in only the
rarest of cases. 15 Those approaches, however, require big changes
by a huge number of actors in the criminal justice system. It is
difficult to affect meaningful change when success depends on
unifying the behavior of thousands of judges, prosecutors,
legislators, or jurors.
This Article does not take a position on whether the death
penalty is good or bad public policy. Nor do I suggest that we
should have a larger or smaller number of executions. Instead, I
take as a starting point the premise that we will have the same
number of executions that the United States has carried out over
the last few decades.
My argument is that we should have a better process for
eliminating costly and legally debatable death sentences from the
system earlier in the process. Prosecutors and defense lawyers
should not spend fifteen years and thousands of work hours
fighting over death sentences that are unlikely to be carried out.
Instead, governors 16 should utilize their unique commutation
power to remove weak cases—those that will eat up years of
resources but probably not end in executions—from the criminal

15. To a certain extent this is already happening. The number of new death
sentences is down dramatically in the last few years. In 2013, there were eightytwo death sentences in the United States. In 2014, the number fell to seventythree. And in 2015, it was only forty-nine. See Death Sentences in the United
States From 1977 by State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,INFORMATION
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-19772008 (last visited June 16, 2016) (tracking the decline in death sentences per
year ) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Of course, even those
low numbers still exceeded the number of executions in each year. See Number
of Executions Since 1976, supra note 9 (reporting thirty-nine executions in 2013,
thirty-five in 2014, and twenty-eight in 2015).
16. Typically, the governor has the sole authority to grant clemency. In a
few states, however, the pardon board has some or all of the authority. For a
summary, see generally Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the Unforgivable:
Reinvigorating the Use of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REV.
751, 787 (2013) (arguing that state clemency procedures “must satisfy minimal
procedural due process”). The main thesis of this articlethat governors should
use clemency power to plea bargainapplies with equal force to pardon boards.
Indeed, because they are more politically insulated, the argument should apply
with even greater force to pardon boards.
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justice system. And governors should utilize that power early in
the appellate process. 17
This Article proposes that governors engage in post-trial plea
bargaining with death-row inmates. In the weakest casesthose
where it seems likely that a conviction or death sentence might
be reversed on direct appeal or habeas corpusgovernors should
offer a deal to the inmate. If the inmate drops all of his appeals
and agrees not to file future habeas petitions, his death sentence
will be commuted to life without parole or some other term of
imprisonment. In the same way that prosecutors plead out weak
cases before trial, governors should plead out weak capital cases
during the appellate and habeas process.
The use of gubernatorial plea bargaining fits squarely in the
American criminal justice system. Plea bargaining has become so
important that the Supreme Court has recognized that it is no
longer just an “adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the
criminal justice system.” 18 Over ninety percent of criminal
convictions result from plea bargaining. 19 Yet, there is virtually
no post-trial plea bargaining in the American criminal justice
system. 20 There are likely two reasons for this. First, prosecutors
and courts likely lack the power to alter a sentence that has
already been imposed. 21 Second, even if prosecutors had the
17. Although pardons and commutations typically come on the eve of
executions, there is no requirement that governors leave them until after the
end of the appellate process. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 92 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1939) (noting that California governors can grant clemency any time
after conviction and even before a sentence is handed down); COLO. REV. STAT.
16-17-101 (2015) (authorizing capital commutations “when [the governor] deems
it proper”).
18. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert Scott
& William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912
(1992)).
19. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, Table 5.22.2009, http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf (compiling data that tracks how many criminal
defendants per year received a conviction by agreeing to a plea bargain).
20. See Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2006) (“In
the grand scheme of things, however, habeas settlements are very rare.”).
21. See id. at 37 (“The finalthough importantexplanation for the low
prevalence of habeas settlements is that few state courts and no federal courts
have the power to amend a sentence after sentencing.”). Professor Malani
suggests that Congress amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 “to permit
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authority to negotiate following a conviction, they would have
little incentive to do so. Affirmance rates in ordinary criminal
cases are extremely high. 22 For example, in Harris County,
Texasthe so-called capital of capital punishment 23the district
attorney’s office has an overall affirmance rate in excess of
ninety-five percent. 24 With such high affirmance rates, the
government has little incentive to bargain after trial. This
explains why plea bargaining is a pre-trial phenomenon and why
defendants instead spend the post-trial process slowly churning
their way through the formal appellate and habeas process rather
than negotiating deals.
The same logic, however, should not hold for capital cases.
Death sentences are followed by decades of litigation. 25 And that
litigation often results in reversal of convictions and death
sentences. In a path-breaking study, Professor James Liebman
and his colleagues documented that between 1973 and 1995,
sixty-eight percent of death sentences were reversed on direct
appeal or habeas review. 26 Of course, as Professor Liebman and
courts, upon the government’s motion, to amend a prisoner’s sentence if she
drops her habeas claims, regardless of whether the modified sentence was
within the statutory or guideline range for the prisoner’s offense.” Id. at 48. For
another interesting bargaining proposalthis one on a systemic basissee
James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315,
332–34 (2002) (suggesting the exchange of procedural safeguards, such as
videotaped confessions and more robust direct review, for foregoing some state
and federal habeas review).
22. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, WIS. L. REV. 291, 320–21 (2006) (noting that
“reversals in criminal cases are quite rare”).
23. See Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of Capital
Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 718 (2009) (exploring the death
penalty process in Harris County, Texas, and comparing it to other counties
across the United States).
24. Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. OF THE DISTRICT ATT’Y, HARRIS
COUNTY, TEX.. http://app.dao.hctx.net/FAQs/2/Appellate.aspx (last visited Sept.
7, 2016) (describing other appellate avenues that are available to defendants in
the event that their convictions are affirmed) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
25. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing how executions are
not carried out until, on average, fifteen years after the initial sentencing).
26. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS
SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 422–28
(2002) (explaining that “the death penalty in this country is a broken system
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other scholars have recognized in subsequent work, reversals
have become less frequent in recent years. 27 Nevertheless, it
remains quite common for capital convictions and death
sentences to be reversed. 28
It also almost goes without saying that capital cases are
much more expensive than ordinary cases at the post-trial
stages. 29 Unlike ordinary defendants, many death-row inmates
are represented by counsel in the habeas process. 30 The death
penalty bar specializes in capital litigation and files detailed
appellate briefs that require considerable time and attention from
the attorney general’s office as well as judges and clerks.
We therefore know that (1) capital cases are much more
expensive than ordinary cases and (2) states lose a considerable
number of death penalty cases during the appellate and habeas
process. 31 Now add two other facts: (3) states are struggling
that is of rising concern to many Americans”).
27. See James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s
Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 337 n.415 (2011)
(“Given Congress’s adoption of legislation in 1996 reducing federal prisoners’
access to federal habeas corpus review, it is likely that the reversal rate in
federal court has declined recently.”); NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM
AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 61 (2007) (reviewing 267 capital
cases filed between 2000 and 2002 and finding that twelve percent received
habeas relief in federal district court).
28. See Jordan M. Steiker, Peculiar Times for a Peculiar Institution, 48
TULSA L. REV. 357, 365 (2012) (explaining that “reversal rates in capital cases
reached astonishing levels in the first two decades following [Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)] and remain significant (albeit diminished) today”).
29. See Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
475, 544–45 (2013) (discussing studies indicating that, in Maryland, capital
appeals cost five times more than non-capital cases, and that in Kansas, capital
appeals cost twenty times more than non-capital appeals).
30. See KING ET AL., supra note 27, at 62 (2007) (noting that “all but seven
percent of death row filers have counsel to assist them in seeking federal habeas
relief, while all but seven percent of non-capital prisoners proceed pro se”).
31. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 65 (1997) (explaining that
death-row inmates “often have very high-quality volunteer representation on
habeas corpus” and as a result there “has been both a large volume of habeas
litigation in capital cases and strikingly high success rates for capital
defendants”).
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financially, 32 and (4) while counties initiate capital prosecutions,
it is typically the states that pay the bills for the appellate and
habeas process. 33 Faced with these four facts, states should be
willing to plea bargain after trial if they think a death sentence is
unlikely to survive on appeal and actually result in execution.
That plea bargaining should logically fall to the only executive
branch actor with authority to stop the death penalty process—
the governor.
Put another way, governors are elected to act in the best
interests of their states. When they see a weak death sentence
moving through the system that is likely to cost the state
considerable litigation costs but not end in execution, the
governor should step forward and cut a deal that eliminates the
costly litigation. The inmate, in turn, should want the deal in
order to eliminate the possibility of being executed.
Requiring an inmate to forego future appeals in exchange
for clemency is what is called a “conditional commutation.” 34
Presidents and governors have sporadically used conditional
commutations in the past. For instance, chief executives have
commuted non-capital sentences in exchange for inmates
renouncing terrorism, pursuing a high school degree, and even
donating a kidney. 35 Although there is not a tremendous amount
of case law, the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld
conditional commutations in the past. 36 And because the
condition would be the waiver of appealssomething that
32. See Julie Bosman, States Confront Cavernous Holes in Their Budgets,
N.Y. TIMES, (June 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/us/statesconfront-wide-budget-gaps-even-after-years-of-recovery.html?_r=0 (last visited
Sept. 7, 2016) (discussing the major funding gaps confronting many state
legislatures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See Pay Now, Execute Later, supra note 12, at 864 n.18 (offering several
examples of states that pay for these appeals).
34. See Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional
Pardoning Power, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1668 (2001) (noting that “from
President Washington on, presidents have attached conditions to many pardons
and commutations”).
35. See infra notes 81–106 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
more extreme restrictions that governors have placed on grants of clemency).
36. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme
Court is not opposed to some of these odd clemency arrangements).
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regularly occurs in pre-trial plea bargaining 37it is nearly
certain that the conditional commutation would be well within
governors’ authority. 38
In short, conditional commutations have occurred throughout
American history, and they appear to be perfectly
constitutional. 39 To date, however, governors have not used
conditional commutations as a form of post-trial plea bargaining
to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system. Of
course, there are political reasons why governors are reluctant to
exercise their clemency power. 40 But in an era when a few states
have abolished capital punishment altogether because of its
astronomical cost, 41 the exercise of capital clemency may not be
the third rail of politics that it has long been. 42 Now may be the
time for executive clemency to become a regular part of an
efficient death penalty process.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II briefly reviews the
paltry state of capital clemency. Part III describes not just the low
number of death penalty commutations over the last forty years,
but also how those commutations are typically reserved for claims
of innocence or other defendant-specific characteristics, rather
than to facilitate a functional criminal justice system. Part III
then recounts some significant conditional commutations that
have been issued over the years. Part IV explains why a deal in
37. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea Bargaining Market: From
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011)
(“[M]ost guilty pleas waive defendants’ rights to appeal.”).
38. See infra notes 156–158 and accompanying text (explaining how some
governors have experienced political fallout after granting clemency).
39. See Conditional Pardons, 1 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1821) (“The
President has power to grant a conditional pardon to a convict, provided the
condition be compatible with the genius of our constitution and laws.”).
40. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital
Clemency, 17 J. L. & POL. 669, 671 (2001) [hereinafter The Diffusion of
Responsibility] (noting that governors seeking reelection rarely exercise their
clemency power).
41. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing five states that
have abolished the death penalty).
42. Indeed, Professor Michael Heise’s empirical work casts doubt on the
conventional wisdom that politicians are completely unwilling to exercise their
clemency power. See Heise, supra note 11, at 979–84 (listing governors who
have emptied death row as they left office).

POST-TRIAL PLEA BARGAINING IN CAPITAL CASES

1369

which a governor commutes a death sentence in exchange for the
inmate foregoing any future appeals would be perfectly
constitutional. Parts V and VI then address the most likely
objections to my proposal. Part V explains how it would be
possible for governors to know early in the appellate process of
many capital cases that a reversal is more likely than an
execution. Part VI then addresses the objection that politics will
prevent governors from using their commutation power to plea
bargain.
II. Capital Clemency Is Rare Overall and Used for Limited
Reasons
It is well known that capital clemency in the United States is
rare. Governors dispense mercy from death sentences far less
often than in decades past. 43 Moreover, governors typically grant
capital clemency only for a narrow range of reasons. This Part
briefly recounts the quantitative decline in capital clemency over
the last century and explains how commutations are reserved for
a very limited set of rationales.
As Professor Hugo Adam Bedau documented, capital
clemency was fairly robust in the first half of the twentieth
century. One out of every four or five death sentences was
commuted. 44 For instance, between 1900 and 1958 there were 101
death sentences and thirty commutations in Massachusetts. 45 In
New York from 1920 to 1936 there were 252 death sentences and
eighty-three commutations. 46 Even southern statestoday’s socalled death belthad significant numbers of commutations.
Texas alone commuted eighty-five death sentences between 1924
and 1968. 47
Matters are far different today. In the forty years since
capital punishment was reinstated in the United Statesfrom
43. See Bedau, supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the
declining rate of clemency).
44. Id. at 266.
45. Id. at 265.
46. Id.
47. Id.

1370

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1359 (2016)

1976 to 2015only 280 death row inmates have received
clemency. 48 And that number is dramatically inflated by “mass
commutations” in which a handful of governors have emptied
death row. 49 Most notably, in 2003, Governor George Ryan
commuted all of death row in Illinois (167 people) because of
flaws in the state’s capital punishment system and an alarming
number of exonerations. 50 Additionally, there have been smaller
mass commutations that have emptied death rows in New
Mexico, Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland, and a second time in
Illinois. 51 In total, mass commutations account for roughly 210 of
the 280 capital clemency grants over the last forty years. 52 In
only about seventy cases over the last forty years have governors
or pardon boards individually analyzed an inmate’s case and
decided to commute a sentence or pardon the inmate. 53
To put matters in perspective, consider the number of death
sentences, executions, and individualized commutations over the
last forty years. From 1977 to 2015, there were 7,867 death
48. See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
clemency (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (noting that the humanitarian reasons for
clemency include “doubts about the defendant’s guilt or judgments about the
death penalty by the governor”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
49. See infra notes 50–52 (discussing recent instances of mass
commutations).
50. See Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death
Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2003) http://www.nytimes.com/2003/
01/12/us/citing-issue-of-fairness-governor-clears-out-death-row-in-illinois.html
(last visited July 9, 2016) (describing Governor Ryan’s decision to commute the
sentences of all inmates on death row) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Some observers (and prosecutors) have suggested that Governor
Ryan commuted death row out of personal interest because he was facing
indictment on criminal misconduct charges (for which he was subsequently
convicted and incarcerated) and thought the commutations would help his
reputation. See JAMES L. MERRINER, THE MAN WHO EMPTIED DEATH ROW:
GOVERNOR GEORGE RYAN AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME 137 (2008) (“Prosecutors
suggested, subtly but unmistakably, that Ryan’s blanket clemency for death row
prisoners was designed to overshadow his impending indictment.”).
51. Clemency, supra note 48.
52. See id. (listing each commutation); see also Rethinking the Timing,
supra note 10, at 13 (reviewing the sixty-six individualized commutations
through 2014).
53. Id.
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sentences in the United States, but only 1,422 executions. 54 Of
the more than 6,000 remaining people who sat on death row
(many of whom stayed there for many years), only about seventy
people received an individualized commutation. 55
The conventional wisdom for the small number of capital
clemencies is well known: commutations and pardons are not
good politics. Governors who aspire to run for president likely
have great concern about the unpopularity of commuting death
sentences. 56 The politics of crime became much more punitive in
the second half of the twentieth century. Richard Nixon
campaigned for the presidency on a law-and-order campaign in
1968. 57 Longer, harsher sentences became a fixture of the 1980s
as rehabilitation went out of style and was replaced by
retributivism and deterrence as the goals of punishment. 58 Led by
President Clinton, Democrats eventually adopted the tough-oncrime rhetoric as well. 59 In an environment in which mercy and
rehabilitation took a backseat to retribution and deterrence, it is
not surprising that governors and their appointed pardon boards
became less willing to grant clemency. 60
54. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 8,
2016) (compiling the data on the race of death row inmates) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Clemency for Our Children, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 2641, 2688–89 (2011) (discussing political dangers of
clemency).
57. See generally Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?
Rethinking The Warren Court’s Role in Criminal Procedure, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1361, 1364 (2004).
58. See Judge Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too
Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 691,
698 (2010) (“The public, and certain members of the academy, gave up on
rehabilitation as a central purpose of sentencing, instead championing a
philosophy known as ‘limited’ retribution.”).
59. See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To Do With It? The Political,
Social Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development
of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 42–43 (1997) (noting the
realization of Congressional Democrats in the 1990s that “their traditional
support of more liberal crime policies had become a major political liability”).
60. See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of
Criminal Law, 90 NYU L. REV. 802, 815–18 (2015) [hereinafter Clemency and
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The politics of crime help to explain the limited reasons why
governors grant clemency. With the exception of sporadic mass
commutations, governors have consistently adopted a fairly
narrow set of reasons for granting capital clemency. In his 1991
article, Professor Bedau recounted the reasons for mercy in
capital cases. 61 He found that governors granted clemency for
possible innocence; proportionality with co-defendants’ sentences;
public opposition to the death penalty (in the 1960s);
unconstitutionality of death penalty statutes; rehabilitation of the
offender; mitigating factors about the inmate’s background; and,
in the case of one governor, a non-unanimous decision by the
appellate courts about the legality of defendants’ convictions. 62
Matters have not changed much in the modern era. Not
surprisingly, the most common reason for capital clemency over
the last forty years has been doubts about an inmate’s guilt. In
roughly two-dozen of the seventy individualized commutations,
the primary rationale for mercy was doubt about the guilt of the
death-row inmate. 63 In other cases, governors have pointed to
proportionality concerns (such as a co-defendant not being
sentenced to death 64 or the inmate not being the triggerperson). 65 In some cases, 66 governors commuted sentences
because of characteristics about the inmate, such as mental
Presidential Administration] (explaining how the lack of parole and “tough on
crime” attitudes reduced clemency).
61. See Bedau, supra note 7, at 259–60 (discussing a grant of clemency
when the Supreme Court expressed concern about a death penalty sentence).
62. Id.
63. See Rethinking the Timing, supra note 10, at 7–12 (discussing nine
cases in detail); Clemency, supra note 48 (summarizing clemency rationale in
each case for the last forty years).
64. See, e.g., Governor of Indiana Spares Death Row Inmate, L.A. TIMES
(July 3, 2004) http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/03/nation/na-spare3 (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (listing the governor’s reasoning as unfairness, since
another co-defendant only received a life in prison sentence) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See Ralph Blumenthal, Governor Commutes Sentence in Texas, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/us/31execute.html
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (detailing the commutation of Kenneth Foster) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Clemency, supra note 48 (summarizing clemency rationale in each
case for the last forty years).
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health problems, 67 abusive childhood, 68 or rehabilitation while in
prison. 69 In a small number of cases, governors commuted
sentences for less conventional reasons such as requests from the
prosecutor, 70 the victim’s family, 71 and even the Pope. 72
Very few commutations have been granted over the last forty
years because of flaws in the legal process of a case. In a few
cases, governors appeared to base commutations in part on
ineffective assistance of counsel. 73 However, in each of these
67. See Donald P. Baker, Va. Governor Commutes First Death Sentence,
WASH.
POST
(May
13,
1999),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/local/daily/may99/swann13.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (detailing the
commutation of Calvin E. Swann) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
68. See Randall Chase, Del. Governor Spares Life of Killer, ASSOC. PRESS
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-01-18/news/30639619_1_pardonsboard-commutation-death-sentence (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that the
4–1 decision of the parole board in favor of commutation influenced Governor
Markell’s decision to commute Robert Gattis’ sentence) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See Justin M. Norton, Virginia Gov. Commute Death Sentence;
Colorado Gov. Denies Clemency, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 15, 1997),
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1997/Virginia-Gov-commutes-death-sentenceColorado-Gov-denies-clemency/id-63ebbf83bbfe750ebdeb591bb8a104fb
(last
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing the commutation of William Ira Saunders) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See Reginald Fields, Ohio Gov. John Kasich Commutes Inmate’s Death
Sentence to Life in Prison, PLAIN DEALER (July 10, 2012, 11:53 PM)
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/07/ohio_governor_commutes_inm
ates.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that the prosecutor’s
recommendation was one of multiple factors) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
71. See Ronald Smothers, A Day Short of Death, a Georgia Killer Is Given
Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 1990) http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/22/us/a-dayshort-of-death-a-georgia-killer-is-given-life.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)
(noting that the advocates for granting William Moore clemency included
Mother Teresa and Rev. Jesse Jackson) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
72. See Stephanie Simon, Pope’s Appeal for Mercy Saves Murderer’s Life,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1999) http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jan/29/news/mn2872/2 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing how Pope John Paul II influenced
the Missouri governor’s decision to grant clemency to Darrell Mease) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. See Kristin M. Hall, Tenn. Governor Commutes Death Sentence, USA
TODAY (Sept. 14, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-0914-1360199315_x.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that Governor
Bredesen commuted an inmate’s death sentence because of what he described as
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cases, even though the rationale for clemency was a flaw (or
perceived flaw) in the legal process, the governor seemingly
granted clemency because the legal flaw rendered the execution
morally questionable.
History therefore seems to tell us that clemency is limited to
cases where governors think an execution would be morally
questionable. This differs dramatically from the pre-trial plea
bargaining process. History tells us that before trial it is perfectly
appropriate for prosecutors to bargain to make the criminal
justice system run smoothly. Over-crowded dockets are
ameliorated by plea bargaining. 74 Weak cases are resolved by
charge bargains to a lower-level offense or sentence bargains to a
shorter term of imprisonment. 75 And plea bargaining is alive and
well at the pre-trial stage in capital cases as well. Prosecutors
regularly seek deathperhaps as a bargaining chip to induce a
guilty plea 76but ultimately agree to a non-capital sentence in
exchange for a guilty plea. 77 More crassly stated, prosecutors
regularly consider resources and the efficiency of the criminal
“grossly inadequate legal representation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
74. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 13 (2003).
75. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2500 (2004).
76. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 2030, 2097 (2000) (explaining that a capital charge “provides the best pleabargaining leverage imaginable”).
77. Professor John Douglass recently provided a startling description of
Virginia’s capital charging:
Virginia prosecutors now charge about twenty cases of capital murder
annually for each case that results in a death sentence. What
happens to the other nineteen cases? Plea bargaining fills much of
that gap. Today, even more than in years past, Virginia’s death
penalty functions primarily as a bargaining chip in a plea negotiation
process that resolves most capital litigation with sentences less than
death.
John G. Douglass, Death as a Bargaining Chip: Plea Bargaining and the Future
of Virginia’s Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 873, 873–74 (2015); see also
Thaxton, supra note 29, at 483 (analyzing charging decisions in Georgia from
1993 to 2000 and concluding that “my conservative estimate is that the threat of
the death penalty increases the likelihood of reaching a plea agreement by
approximately 20 percentage points”).
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justice process before trial. By contrast, at the capital clemency
stage, governors never appear to consider those factors.
There are three obvious reasons why governors do not engage
in clemency bargaining after trial. First, they almost always
consider clemency petitions at the very end of the road after
courts have already rejected appeals and habeas corpus
petitions. 78 At that point, there is no bargaining to be done
because the inmate has nothing to give up. A governor who
grants clemency on the eve of an execution gets nothing in return
because there is no litigation left for the inmate to terminate.
Second, and relatedly, clemency supposedly must be left until the
end of the process because governors would lack the necessary
information to make an informed determination in the middle of
litigation. Third, as noted above, it is considered politically
undesirable for governors to grant clemency. In order to protect
their future political aspirations, governors avoid using their
clemency power except in the most extreme cases.
As I explain in Parts V and VI below, I do not think the latter
two explanations are insurmountable obstacles to using clemency
as a plea bargaining tool. The objections may explain the current
state of affairs, but they are not necessarily the approach that
must guide us moving forward. Before addressing the practical
objections to post-trial plea bargaining though, I turn in Part III
to negotiated, or so-called “conditional,” clemency, which has been
awarded in the past and, in Part IV, to the legality of such
clemency deals.
III. Governors and Presidents Have Issued Conditional Clemency
Governors and presidents have wide power to grant
clemency. 79 The general public likely thinks of the clemency
power as an all-or-nothing approach. 80 People might think that
78. See Rethinking the Timing, supra note 10, at 2–3 (arguing that
governors should not wait until the end of the process to consider clemency).
79. For a classic work on the history and scope of the clemency power, see
generally KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1989) (discussing pardons, reprieves, amnesty, and commutations).
80. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal
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the president has the binary choice of pardoning an individual
(and wiping out his conviction) or doing nothing. Or the public
might think that a governor can choose only between commuting
a death sentence or taking no action. This is the set of choices we
are familiar with because this is what happens most often.
Clemency usually takes the form of complete pardons or sentence
reductions. In fact, however, the clemency power is not an all-ornothing option. Rather, because the clemency power is so broad,
governors and presidents actually have quite a bit of room to
creatively exercise their authority. Some chief executives have
done just that.
Some of the most famous conditional commutations have
been issued by presidents. In 1971, President Nixon conditionally
commuted the sentence of labor leader Jimmy Hoffa. 81 Mr. Hoffa
had been convicted of obstruction of justice and fraud and was
part way through serving a thirteen-year sentence. 82 President
Nixon commuted Hoffa’s sentence and granted him immediate
release, but he imposed the condition that Hoffa “not engage in
direct or indirect management of any labor organization prior to
March 6, 1980.” 83
In 1999, President Clinton offered conditional clemency to
sixteen members of the Puerto Rican nationalist group F.A.L.N. 84
The condition was that, in exchange for clemency, each individual
would have to renounce the use of terrorism to achieve
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006) (“A gulf divides the knowledgeable,
powerful participants inside American criminal justice from the poorly
informed, powerless people outside of it.”).
81. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1225–45 (D.D.C. 1974)
(exploring the historical development of the constitutional power to pardon and
ultimately concluding that the pardon of Mr. Hoffa was lawful).
82. See id. at 1223–24 (noting that Mr. Hoffa first filed petitions for
commutation in December 1971).
83. Id. at 1224. For a discussion of Hoffa’s case, see Patrick R. Cowlishaw,
Note, The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28 STAN. L. REV. 149, 154–55 (1975)
(arguing that a potential for abuse exists within the conditional commutation
framework).
84. See Charles Babington, Puerto Rican Nationalists Freed From Prison,
WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
campaigns /keyraces2000/stories/faln091199.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)
(detailing how President Clinton offered the inmates clemency if they would
renounce violence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

POST-TRIAL PLEA BARGAINING IN CAPITAL CASES

1377

independence for Puerto Rico. 85 Fourteen of the individuals
accepted President Clinton’s terms and had their sentences
commuted. 86 Two other individuals refused the condition and
declined the commutation. 87
On his last day in office in 2001, President Clinton commuted
the sentences of thirty-six drug offenders. 88 Those commutations
included conditions. Some offenders had to take period drug tests
and others were required to serve a period of supervised
release. 89
As Dean Harold Kent has described, many other presidents
have issued conditional commutations:
From President Washington on, presidents have attached
conditions to many pardons and commutations. President
Lincoln’s offer of amnesty to Southern secessionists on the
condition that they take a loyalty oath marks one controversial
example. . . . [P]residents have required, on pain of revocation
of the pardon, that offenders make restitution, drop financial
claims against the government or accept deportation. Perhaps
more surprisingly, presidents have required that offenders not
drink, not associate with undesirables, and provide their
families with greater financial support. 90

Some of those presidential commutations have attached
dramatic and invasive conditions. For instance, President
Coolidge commuted a prison sentence but required that the
inmate
shall abstain from the possession and use of intoxicating
liquor; shall not associate with persons of evil character; shall
lead an orderly, industrious life; shall work and reside where
85. See John M. Broder, 12 Imprisoned Puerto Ricans Accept Clemency
Conditions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/08/us/12imprisoned-puerto-ricans-accept-clemency-conditions.html?page wanted=all (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (“The conditions of their commutation include that they
commit no further crimes and that they limit their association with other Puerto
Rican nationalists who advocate violence.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
86. Babington, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Krent, supra note 34, at 1667.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1668.
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the Attorney General of the United States, through the
Superintendent of Prisons of the Department of Justice, shall
direct; shall maintain and support his divorced wife and their
children to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, and shall
report his residence and occupation to the said Superintendent
of Prisons between the first and fifth days of each month. 91

Governors have likewise issued conditional commutations. In
a famous case, Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia offered
conditional clemency to the basketball star Allen Iverson. While
in high school (when he was already an All-American and sought
after by colleges around the country), Iverson was involved in a
brawl and was accused of striking a woman with a chair. 92
Iverson was convicted of multiple felony charges and sentenced to
fifteen years, with ten suspended. 93 A few months later, after
Iverson had served some jail time, Governor Wilder offered him
conditional clemency: in exchange for release from prison, Iverson
agreed to family counseling, a nightly curfew, and not playing
sports while he finished high school. 94 Two weeks later, Governor
Wilder granted conditional clemency to two other individuals
convicted in the same brawl. 95 According to news reports, “[t]he
men . . . agree[d] to enroll in college and attend classes regularly,
receive family counseling, observe a curfew of 10:30 p.m. on

91. Ex parte Weathers, 33 F.2d 294, 294 (S.D. Fla. 1929).
92. See Ken Armstrong, Iverson Goes to Jail, DAILY PRESS (Sept. 9, 1993),
http://articles.dailypress.com/1993-09-09/news/9309090205_1_iverson-andthree-allen-iverson-overton (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing Iverson’s
conviction and sentencing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
93. Id.
94. See School Star Wins Clemency, N.Y. TIMES (Dec 31, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/31/sports/school-star-wins-clemency.html (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that Iverson’s lawyers argued that there was
reasonable doubt about his conviction) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
95. See Wilder Grants Clemency to Men in Iverson Case, WASH. POST (Jan.
15, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1994/01/15/wildergrants-clemency-to-men-in-iverson-case/f30790c2-1072-4034-8046-e4eb3fc4530b/
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing Governor Wilder’s decision to grant
conditional clemency to the other men involved in the brawl) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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weekdays and midnight on weekends, and remain under Parole
Board supervision.” 96
Governor Haley Barbour made an even more overtsome
would say extremely distasteful 97use of conditional clemency in
Mississippi in 2010. Gladys and Jaime Scott had been sentenced
to life imprisonment following an armed robbery involving only
eleven dollars. 98 Their case had attracted considerable national
attention because of the small amount of money, the steep
punishment, and allegations of racial bias. 99 In addition, Jaime
Scott was in poor health and needed a kidney transplant that
likely would have been paid for by the state of Mississippi. 100
Governor Barbour acceded to the pressure to grant clemency, but
attached a condition: in exchange for clemency, Gladys Scott
would have to donate a kidney to Jaime Scott after release, thus
shifting the costs to Medicaid and saving Mississippi from paying
the costs of Jaime’s medical care. 101 While Governor Barbour’s
kidney
transplant
condition
drew
objections
from
102
the idea of conditioning commutation in the
bioethicists,
abstract drew little fire. 103
96. Id.
97. See Jamila Jefferson-Jones, The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty:
Diminishing the “Yuck Factor” in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate, 16 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 105, 105–06 (2013) (noting that many people’s response to
Governor Barbour’s grant of clemency was not rooted in a legal argument, but
repugnance).
98. Id. at 126.
99. See Timothy Williams, Sisters’ Prison Release Is Tied to Donation of
Kidney, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/us/31
sisters.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing the pressure that Governor
Barbour was under to issue clemency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Timothy Williams, Jailed Sisters Are Released for Kidney
Transplant, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/08
sisters.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that the kidney transplant was
the sisters’ idea) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
103. Indeed, you can find run-of-the-mill language about conditional
commutations on state criminal justice websites. See, e.g., Clemency, OHIO DEP’T
OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTIONS, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/clemency1.
htm (last visited June 16, 2016) (noting that “[a] commutation may be
conditional or unconditional”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law

1380

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1359 (2016)

Of course, most conditional commutations do not involve
terrorists, the most famous labor leader in history, legendary
basketball stars, or organ donation. Rather, most conditional
commutations actually involve the subject of this article:
capital commutations. Governors often commute death
sentences with the condition that inmates remain in prison for
life without the possibility of parole. 104 As I explain in the next
Part, constitutional challenges to conditional commutations
(including those involving the death penalty) have failed.
IV. Clemency as Plea Bargaining Is Constitutional
Would it be constitutional for a governor to strike a deal in
which a death-row inmate agrees to forego all appeals and
habeas petitions in exchange for a commutation to life
imprisonment without parole? The answer appears to be “yes.”
To start with the obvious, presidents and governors 105
have the power to commute a death sentence to life
imprisonment. 106 The Supreme Court held nearly one hundred
years ago, in Biddle v. Perovich, 107 that the president need not
Review).
104. For example, upon leaving office, President Eisenhower commuted the
death sentence of a military prisoner on the condition that he never be eligible
for parole. See Schlick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 268 (1974) (holding “that the
conditional commutation of his death sentence was lawful when made and that
intervening events have not altered its validity”).
105. Most of the authority discussed in this section involves presidential
clemency. Gubernatorial commutations would also have to pass muster under
the relevant state constitutions. Generally speaking, it is clear that clemency
clauses in state constitutions are equally broad and thus the outcome is very
unlikely to be different under state constitutional law.
106. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272
(1998), which required that clemency procedures comport with a minimum
standard of due process, reinforces the broad power of the executive. Chief
executives cannot flip a coin or arbitrarily deny access to the clemency process,
but beyond that a due process violation is extremely unlikely. As Professor
Rachel Barkow has concluded in the presidential context “[t]he pardon power is,
then, a sweeping constitutional power that is checked only by the political
process and the power of voters to elect a new President should they disagree
with the clemency decisions of the current one.” Clemency and Presidential
Administration, supra note 60, at 813.
107. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
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even obtain the consent of an individual to commute his sentence
from death to life. 108
Presidents and governors can attach conditions to
commutations. In 1960, President Eisenhower commuted the
punishment of a military inmate from death to life
imprisonment. 109 Because a pure commutation would have made
Schick eligible for parole under military law, President
Eisenhower imposed a condition that “Schick shall never have
any rights, privileges, claims, or benefits arising under the parole
and suspension or remission of sentence laws of the United
States.” 110 More than a decade after the conditional commutation,
Schick sought parole and eventually filed suit over his
eligibility. 111 The Supreme Court rejected Schick’s challenge,
explaining that “this Court has long read the Constitution as
authorizing the President to deal with individual cases by
granting conditional pardons.” 112 The Court further recognized
that in adding conditions to clemency, chief executives are not
required to choose among conditions in the sentencing statutes.
As the Court explained, “Presidents throughout our history as a
Nation have exercised the power to pardon or commute sentences
upon conditions that are not specifically authorized by statute.” 113
The next question is whether the president or governor can
strike a deal in which the inmate agrees to a condition in
exchange for a commutation. Once again, Supreme Court
precedent clearly offers an affirmative answer. In 1852, President
Fillmore offered to commute William Wells’ death sentence if he
agreed to serve a life term. 114 Wells agreed, 115 but subsequently
108. In a slightly contradictory earlier decision the Court allowed a
newspaper editor who had invoked the Fifth Amendment to refuse a pardon
that would have compelled him to testify. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S.
79, 94 (1915) (noting that it was Burdick’s right to refuse the pardon, and as
such, it was his right to decline to testify).
109. See Schick, 419 U.S. at 257 (explaining that the inmate challenged the
validity of the condition attached to his commutation).
110. Id. at 258.
111. Id. at 259.
112. Id. at 265.
113. Id. at 266.
114. See Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 308 (1856) (noting that Wells accepted
the conditional commutation on the same day it was offered). As the Schick
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argued, inter alia, that the condition was illegal because he
accepted it under duress. 116 The Supreme Court unequivocally
rejected Wells’ challenges to the condition and enforced his
agreement. 117
Thus far we have established that (1) chief executives can
commute death sentences to life imprisonment without parole;
(2) the president or governor can attach conditions to the
commutations; (3) the conditions need not be affirmatively
authorized by underlying statute or law; and (4) the condition can
be the result of a bargained agreement with the inmate. The only
remaining question for our purposes is whether certain conditions
might be so egregious as to be unconstitutional and
unenforceable. Here the answer is “maybe in some cases,” but
certainly not in the case of a condition that requires an inmate to
forego future appeals.
There is far less precedent to determine whether certain
conditions are constitutional. One could imagine that certain
conditions would shock the conscience and be off-limits. 118 To
date, there is no clear precedent forbidding certain conditions. On
the other hand, there is precedent approving conditions that are
far more questionable than requiring inmates to forego future
appeals. President Nixon’s conditional commutation of Jimmy
Hoffa is the most instructive.
After serving about four years of a thirteen-year sentence,
the infamous labor leader Jimmy Hoffa petitioned President
Nixon for a commutation. 119 Hoffa contended that he would not
be a drain on society if released because he could live on his
decision later made clear, Wells’ agreement was not necessary. See supra notes
104–109 and accompanying text (discussing Schick).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 315.
117. Id.
118. See Krent, supra note 34, at 1666 (arguing that granting clemency in
exchange for a kidney is an example of an agreement that “shocks the
conscience”).
119. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (D.D.C. 1974) (noting that
Mr. Hoffa represented in his petition that he “does not have routine problems
usually faced by persons released from prison for the reason that he has a home,
a devoted family, ties in the community, and adequate assurances of a
continuing livelihood”).
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pension and that he “intend[ed] to enter the educational field on a
limited basis as a teacher, lecturer or educator, as may be
approved by your Excellency.” 120 Hoffa’s clemency petition thus
insinuated that if he were released he would not return to labor
organizing activities. President Nixon took Hoffa up on that offer.
In December 1971, President Nixon commuted Hoffa’s sentence
“upon the condition that the said James R. Hoffa not engage in
direct or indirect management of any labor organization prior to
March sixth, 1980.” 121 Hoffa was released from prison but a few
years later he challenged the labor organizing condition on the
ground that it violated his First Amendment rights to free speech
and association. 122
A federal district judge rejected Hoffa’s argument because
“the history and nature of the pardoning power has always
contemplated the type of broad discretion which would permit the
repository of power to devise and attach lawful conditions to its
clemency and to offer the same to the clemency applicant.” 123 The
court applied a two-part test that assessed (1) whether the
condition was directly related to the public interest and
(2) whether it unreasonably infringed on Hoffa’s constitutional
rights. 124 The court had “no hesitation” in finding that a
restriction on Hoffa’s involvement in organized labor was directly
related to the commutation of criminal offenses arising out of
labor activities. 125 And because the Supreme Court had
authorized legislatures to restrict the post-release work activity
of felons, the court found that the President had the same
authority as part of his commutation power. 126
An even more startling condition was imposed by the
governor of Ohio in 1980. Anthony Carchedi, who was serving a
long prison sentence for armed robbery, sought parole and argued
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1224.
122. See id. at 1240–41 (discussing how these claims had been raised by
other prisoners based on conditions of their release set by statute).
123. Id. at 1234.
124. Id. at 1236.
125. Id. at 1237–38.
126. Id. at 1240 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.144 (1960)).
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that he was not a threat to the citizens of Ohio because he had no
family there and would leave the state immediately upon
release. 127 Although Carchedi was not paroled, the governor
commuted his sentence on the condition that he not return to
Ohio until the maximum term of his sentence had run (unless the
parole board offered special permission). 128 Only eight weeks
after being released though, Carchedi sought to re-enter Ohio to
visit his fiancée. 129 The parole board rejected his request, setting
up a challenge to the legality of what Cardechi called a
“banishment” condition. 130 The federal court in Ohio explained
how broad the clemency power is under the Ohio Constitution,
and that a condition will not be invalidated unless it is “found to
be illegal, impossible of performance, or contrary to public
policy.” 131 The court recognized that the condition implicated
constitutional rights of association and travel, but refused to find
the condition illegal because Cardechi had willingly agreed to the
condition. 132 According to the federal court, an agreement to abide
by a condition in exchange for release “is no different from other
agreements in which the government conditions its grant of a
substantial benefit on the relinquishment of a known
constitutional right.” 133 The court thus saw a conditional
commutation as no different than a conventional plea bargain
with a prosecutor in advance of trial. 134
The leading scholarly analysis about conditional clemency
supports the conclusion (if not all of the reasoning) in Hoffa and
Cardechi. As Dean Krent has explained, it would seemingly be
improper to uphold a bargain in which a president granted a
127. See Cardechi v. Rhodes, 560 F. Supp. 1010, 1011–12 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
(describing the conditions of Carchedi’s commutation).
128. Id. at 1012.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1013.
132. See id. at 1017 (noting that Cardechi had initiated the parole
conversation with the governor and had brought up the “no return” option
himself).
133. Id. at 1016.
134. See id. at 1017–18 (analyzing Cardechi’s waiver and finding that he
knowingly and intelligently agreed to the terms presented by the state).
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pardon in exchange for money or for a president to require the
recipient of a pardon to attend Presbyterian Church services (as
opposed to those of some other religion). The former would violate
laws enacted by Congress; the latter would run afoul of the First
Amendment. 135 But absent cases in which the restriction of a
constitutional right is so obvious that it “shocks society’s
conscience,” the inmate’s autonomy interest in deciding whether
to accept the condition should prevail. 136
If it is constitutional for a conditional commutation to impose
restrictions on travel, First Amendment speech, and
organizational rights, it must be permissible for a condition to
require an inmate to forego further appeals and habeas petitions.
Plea bargaining is the engine that runs the American criminal
justice system 137 and a key component of that system is that
defendants waive most of their appellate rights in exchange
for a charge or sentencing bargain. 138 If defendants can
constitutionally waive their appellate rights in exchange for a
pre-trial plea bargain, it stands to reason that death-row
inmates can do the same after conviction.
Consider all of this in totality: (1) the federal and state
constitutions grant sweeping clemency power to chief
executives, (2) inmates have strong (and logical) autonomy
interests in bargaining to avoid execution; (3) defendants are
allowed to waive the very same appellate rights as part of a
pre-trial plea bargain; and (4) courts have upheld even more
questionable conditions, such as the ones in Hoffa and
135. See Krent, supra note 34, at 1699 (describing a condition that a
prisoner violated by association with “unsavory characters”). Another leading
clemency expert suggests additional scenariossuch as requiring a contribution
to a president’s campaign or libraryas unenforceable. See Daniel T. Kobil,
Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 U. ST. THOMAS.
L.J. 698, 718 (2012) (providing examples of likely unconstitutional conditions).
136. See Krent, supra note 34, at 1692 (noting that another rare instance
that could trump an inmate’s autonomy is when a condition “lengthens the
punishment meted out by a court”).
137. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea Bargaining Market, supra note 37, at
1121 (noting that, from 1970 to 2000, most criminal cases were resolved by plea
bargain).
138. See Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of
Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 143 (1999) (arguing that, even with
limitations, plea bargains would not work without waivers of rights).
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Carchedi, that seemingly impinge on core constitutional
principles. This combination of factors should leave little
doubt that it is constitutional for a governor to condition a
commutation on an inmate foregoing all further appeals and
habeas corpus petitions.
V. It Is Not Difficult to Identify (Some) Weak Capital Cases
Early in the Appellate Process
Having established the constitutionality of using
clemency to engage in post-trial plea bargaining, the next
question is would governors practically be able to identify the
weak cases that should be commuted? In other words, would
it be too difficult for governors to know early in the appellate
process that a case is likely to be reversed on appeal? Some
critics might object that the legal problems most likely to lead
to an appellate or habeas reversal cannot be known early in a
capital case. Indeed, some legal issues that account for a
considerable number of reversalsfor instance, ineffective
assistance of counsel and Brady violations 139are typically
not even brought until after a hearing in the habeas corpus
process. 140
The argument that governors won’t know enough early in the
process to make an informed decision about which sentences to
commute has some merit, but it is certainly not fatal. It is true
139. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of
the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors,
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 90 (2005) (describing the findings of a study
that looked at when these two arguments for reversal occur). See generally
JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET. AL, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES,
1973–1995 (2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/
liebman_final.pdf (tracking the reasons for reversals in capital cases).
140. Some states do not allow ineffective assistance claims to be brought
until after direct review is completed. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Structural
Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 689 (2007) (explaining that “the vast majority of
jurisdictions do not allow defendants to open or supplement the trial court
record to support [ineffective assistance] claims”); Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C.L. REV. 1069, 1097 & n.165 (2009)
(noting that “the review of ineffective assistance review is largely limited to
collateral attacks”).
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that in many cases it would be very hard for governors to know
whether a case will survive the appellate gauntlet. I am happy to
concede that governors will not be able to perfectly predict which
cases will be reversed. I concede that because my proposal does
not require governors to weed out all of the weak cases or even
most of them. My proposal is that governors should only select
the obviously weak cases. 141
Sometimes governors might guess wrong and allow a weak
case to remain in the system. Sometimes they might remove a
case from death row that could have survived appellate scrutiny.
I certainly do not suggest otherwise. My argument is only that
there are a sizeable number of cases in which governors’ educated
guesses are likely to be accurate, and those cases are worth
millions in litigation costs.
So, how would governors know which cases to commute? The
first obvious set of cases would be the ones in which an appellate
court was divided on direct review. When judges dissent on direct
review they typically write detailed opinions specifying their
reasons. Governors could simply have their legal counsel read
and analyze the dissenting opinions to see if they find the
dissenting opinions convincing. In assessing the divided cases,
governors could also consider other factors about the dissents.
For instance, was the dissent written by a judge with a
reputation for being skeptical of the death penalty? Or was the
dissent authored by a judge who has regularly upheld death
sentences in the past? Was there only one dissenting vote, or did
multiple judges believe that a death sentence was
unconstitutional? In short, governors could utilize some
background knowledge about the judiciary, do some nose
counting, and have their counsel’s office do some legal analysis.
In some cases this will be more than sufficient to hazard a good
prediction that an inmate will probably not be executed.

141. The number of weak cases will vary across the United States. In some
jurisdictions it might be a large percentage of cases. Think of California, which
executes almost no one. In other states it might be a small percentage of cases.
Think of Texas, which is quite skilled at quickly getting from death sentence to
execution. I am certainly not suggesting that each state should commute an
equal percentage of death sentences.
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A second set of cases governors would look closely at would
be ones in which a problematic actor had been involved in the
prosecution. 142 For instance, consider Dr. George Denkowski, a
psychologist who examined at least sixteen defendants sentenced
to death in Texas. 143 Denkowski testified as an expert witness for
the State of Texas and told juries that defendants met the
intelligence threshold to be executed. 144 Yet, psychologists and
defense attorneys complained that Denkowski used unscientific
methods that artificially inflated defendants’ intelligence scores
in order to make them death eligible. 145 In 2011, Dr. Denkowski
reached a settlement with the Texas State Board of Examiners of
Psychologists in which he agreed never to perform the tests again
in exchange for complaints against him being dismissed. 146 At the
time of the settlement, fourteen of the sixteen inmates Dr.
Denkowski testified against remained on death row. 147
After the rebuke of Dr. Denkowski, the governor of Texas
could have, but did not, commute any of the death penalty cases
Denkowski was involved in. Instead, costly litigation continued.
For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the
case of John Matamoros to the trial court to re-examine the
psychological evidence. 148 The trial court denied relief and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, over the dissent of two judges,
affirmed. 149 The case then proceeded to wind its way through the
142. I am grateful to Professor Lee Kovarsky for making this point to me.
143. See Brandi Grissom, Texas Psychologist Punished in Death Penalty
Cases, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2011), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/04/15/
texas-psychologist-punished-in-death-penalty-cases/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)
(noting that Dr. Denkowski still defends his practices in evaluating inmates) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Brandi Grissom, Death Sentence Reviews Leave Unsettled Issues in
Texas, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/us/
reviews-of-texas-death-row-cases-leave-unsettled-issues.html?_r=0 (last visited
Sept. 8, 2016) (discussing the settlement agreement with Dr. Denkowski) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. See Ex parte Matamoros, Nos. WR–50791–02, WR–50791–03, 2012 WL
4713563, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2012) (relying principally on the
increased questioning of Dr. Denkowski’s methods).
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federal courts, where it remains today. 150 Perhaps Matamoros
will ultimately be executed. But there stands a good chance that
his case (and the other cases involving Dr. Denkowski) will not
end in executions.
A third set of cases for governors to consider commuting are
those likely to be effected by recent Supreme Court decisions. For
instance, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v.
Virginia 151 forbidding the execution of the mentally retarded, it
was unclear who qualified as mentally handicapped. 152 Almost
any legal observer could have predicted that litigating that
question would take years. And, indeed, in the nearly fifteen
years since Atkins there has been a tremendous amount of legal
wrangling. During that time, courts have reversed the death
sentences of ninety-eight inmates because of a finding of mental
handicap or retardation. 153 Some of those reversals might not
have been predicted. But governors surely could have looked at
the evidence in a number of those Atkins cases and predicted that
the death sentences would be overturned. Indeed, in roughly a
dozen of those cases, the inmates had IQ scores in the fifties. 154
Governors in these and other cases could have preemptively
granted clemency to short circuit the time-consuming and
expensive appellate process.
In asserting that governors can predict that certain death
sentences are likely to be reversed, I do not want to over-claim. I
am not asserting that governors will know the outcome of all or
even most death sentences. And I am not guaranteeing that
governors would always predict correctly without engaging in
false positives or false negatives. I am asserting only that in some
150. See Matamoros v. Stephens, 783 F.3d 212, 227 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding
that Matamoros was competent to be executed).
151. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
152. See id. at 304 (giving the authority to the states to determine how to
evaluate mental handicap).
153. See Defendants Whose Death Sentences Have Been Reduced Because of a
Finding of “Mental Retardation” Since Atkins v. Virginia (2002), DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2395 (last updated
July 19, 2012) (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (detailing the “wide variations among
states in exempting defendants with intellectual disability from the death
penalty”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
154. Id.
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cases governors can make educated guesses that are very likely to
be correct, and that those estimations would save the states a
tremendous amount of time and money. If that is correct, the
remaining question is whether governors would make those
commutation deals or whether politics would stand in the way.
VI. Politics Is Not a Fatal Obstacle to Post-Trial Plea Bargaining
Via Executive Clemency
The most significant objection to a proposal for governors to
use their clemency power to plea bargain weak cases out of the
system is that governors will not be willing to take the political
risk. The conventional wisdom is that commutations are bad
politics and that governors, who often want to be presidents, are
not interested in anything that is bad politics. Thus governors try
to pass the buck to pardon boards and the courts so as not to be
responsible for executions. 155
The paltry number of individualized commutationsroughly
seventy in forty yearssuggests that the conventional wisdom is
correct. Moreover, when governors have gone out on a limb and
commuted the sentences of murderers, they have suffered
criticism and occasional electoral defeats. For instance, Governor
Mike Huckabee was criticized for granting clemency to a man
who went on to murder four police officers. 156 Decades earlier,
Governor Michael DiSalle of Ohio likely lost re-election in part
because he commuted six death sentences. 157 And although not a
commutation, the furlough of convicted murderer Willie Horton
in Massachusetts (who subsequently raped a woman) was

155. See The Diffusion of Responsibility, supra note 40, at 671–73 (listing
examples of governors, courts, and pardon boards all saying that it is one of the
other group’s responsibility to determine clemency).
156. See Clemency and Presidential Administration, supra note 60, at 823
(explaining why some pundits thought this grant of clemency would limit
Governor Huckabee’s chances at being elected to other political offices).
157. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the
Pardoning Power From the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 607–08 (1991) (describing
how the press mocked the governor for seeming “soft” on crime).
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politically devastating to Governor Michael Dukakis as he ran for
president. 158
The argument for the conventional wisdom is strong, but
there are reasons to be skeptical of the contention that governors
will never embrace executive clemency. Starting with the
non-capital context, governors with future aspirations have been
more willing to grant clemency than people recognize. As
Professor Rachel Barkow has explained, Governor Mike
Huckabee granted clemency to more than 1,000 people, many
during his first term in office. 159 Other governors with bright
political futuressuch as Tim Kaine of Virginia and Robert
Ehrlich of Marylandmade robust use of their clemency
Indeed,
even
the
most
politically
savvy
power. 160
politicianssuch as Governor (and former head of the Republican
National Committee) Haley Barbouraggressively exercised
clemency power in recent years. 161
Turning to the capital context, Professor Michael Heise’s
careful empirical study of clemency grants found that political
variables had no statistically significant impact. 162 A few
anecdotal examples further the story. For instance, John Kasich
was elected governor of Ohio in 2010 after a long political career
in Washington, D.C. and with well-known aspirations to run for
president. (In fact, Kasich did run for president in 2016.) Shortly
158. See Carl Hulse, Bipartisan Criminal Justice Overhaul Is Haunted by
Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01
/05/us/politics/bipartisan-criminal-justice-overhaul-is-haunted-by-willie-horton.html
?_r=0 (last visited Aug. 29, 2016) (“Lawmakers are reluctant to campaign on a
platform of letting felons out of prison . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
159. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing
Clemency, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 153 (2009) [hereinafter The Politics of
Forgiveness] (observing that Governor Huckabee’s “approach to clemency seems
to have been driven in part by [his] religious faith and moral convictions”).
160. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias
and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 327 (2013) [hereinafter
Prosecutor Bias] (explaining some of the motivations these governors expressed
regarding their grants of clemency).
161. See Cara H. Drinan: Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV.
1123, 1149–50 (2012) (noting that many of these grants of clemency are still
being challenged in the courts).
162. See generally Heise, supra note 11, at 983–84.
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after taking office, Governor Kasich commuted five death
sentences. The reasons for the commutations were variedlevel
of involvement in the crime, abusive childhood, mental
incapacity, lack of a life without parole option, and poor legal
representationbut notably in none of the cases was there strong
evidence of innocence. 163 These commutations therefore carried
some political risk, but Governor Kasich granted the
commutations anyway.
When Maryland abolished capital punishment in 2013, it did
not do so retroactively, thus leaving four inmates on death row. 164
Governor Martin O’Malley, who had plans to run for president,
could have ignored those four inmates, but he commuted their
sentences to life without parole. 165
Relatedly, over the last decade there has been a growing
consensus that cost is a major factor in criminal justice
decision-making. As Professor Cara Drinan has explained, “the
economic downturn has forced even states with the toughest
record on criminal sanctions to reconsider sentencing policy.” 166
Texas declined to build expensive new prisons and instead
diverted offenders to treatment programs. 167 Multiple states have
softened drug-sentencing laws to reduce the costs of
incarceration. 168 Conservative politiciansa group formerly at
the forefront of tough on crime politicsformed the “Right on
163. Clemency, supra note 48.
164. See Alan Blinder, Life Sentences for Last Four Facing Death in
Maryland, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/01/us/
maryland-governor-omalley-commutes-death-sentences-emptying-death-row.html
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing Governor O’Malley’s decision to “empty
the state’s death row”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
165. See John Wagner, Gov. O’Malley to Commute Sentences of Maryland’s
POST
(Dec.
31,
2014),
Remaining
Death-Row
Inmates,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/gov-omalley-commutes-sentencesof-marylands-remaining-death-row-inmates/2014/12/31/044b553a-90ff-11e4-a412-4b
735edc7175_story.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that Governor
O’Malley’s decision came “two years after he persuaded the legislature to repeal
capital punishment”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
166. Drinan, supra note 161, at 1150.
167. Id.
168. See Mary D. Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 165, 173 (2013) (listing other reforms, such as rehabilitation programs,
that states have also enacted).
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Crime” movement in an effort to promote cost-effective criminal
justice. 169
I am not arguing that governors are now ready to robustly
embrace capital clemency. Rather, I am making the more modest
assertion that there are weaknesses in the conventional story
that governors are petrified of commuting death sentences. And
with the emerging recognition around the country that costs
should factor into criminal justice decision-making, there is room
for governors to consider using their power to engage in post-trial
plea bargaining.
VII. Conclusion
Only days before Robert Gattis was to be executed in early
2012, Governor Jack Markell of Delaware commuted Gattis’
death sentence because he had been physically and sexually
abused as a child. 170 Governor Markell conditioned the
commutation as follows:
(1) Mr. Gattis shall forever drop all legal challenges to
his conviction and sentence, as commuted; (2) Mr. Gattis
shall forever waive any right to present a future
commutation or pardon request and agree to live out his
natural life in the custody of the Department of
Correction; (3) Mr. Gattis will be housed in the
Maximum Security Unit . . . and (4) Mr. Gattis, after
consultation with counsel, shall knowingly, willingly and
voluntarily accept these conditions, as determined by the
Superior Court. 171
169. See Randolph N. Jonakait & Larry Eger, The Fiscal Crisis as an
Opportunity for Criminal Justice Reform: Defenders Building Alliances With
Fiscal Conservatives, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1161, 1167–68 (2012) (arguing that,
even if it is difficult to ally with people who formally were “tough on crime,”
partnership is worth it).
170. See Bill Mears, Delaware Governor Commutes Death Sentence, CNN
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/17/justice/delaware-death-sentence/
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (explaining that at the time of commutation, Gattis
had already exhausted his legal appeals) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
171. STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR JACK MARKELL REGARDING THE COMMUTATION
OF SENTENCE OF ROBERT GATTIS (Jan. 17, 2012), http://news.delaware.gov/
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Gattis agreed to the conditions, the commutation moved forward,
and Gattis was spared execution.
On the surface, Governor Markell’s conditional commutation
seems to be the approach I have advocated for in this Article. The
governor and an inmate struck a deal whereby the governor
granted commutation and the inmate agreed to forego future
appeals. However, the Gattis commutation differed in a
significant respect from the approach I have advocated. Governor
Markell granted clemency after the appeals process had run its
course and only days before Gattis was to be executed. As such,
Governor Markell did not procure a tangible benefit for the State
of Delaware in exchange for the commutation. While we can
debate whether it would be morally preferable to execute or not
execute Gattis, there is no question that Governor Markell’s lastminute commutation did not save the State of Delaware money
by reducing costly litigation.
This Article has argued that governors should not limit
clemency simply to situations in which executions seem morally
questionable. Governors should instead more broadly utilize their
clemency power to improve the functioning of the capital
punishment system. Capital clemency should be used as a form of
post-trial plea bargaining in which governors weed weak cases
out of the system. Governors should engage in clemency
bargaining early in the appellate life of a capital case. When
there is a good indication that a capital case will not end in
execution, perhaps because judges dissented on direct review and
foreshadowed a later appellate or habeas reversal, governors
should strike a deal with the death-row inmate. In exchange for
clemency, the inmate must give up all further appellate review of
the case. Such conditional commutations would be perfectly
constitutional. And in a sizeable number of cases, the deal would
be in the best interests of the State and the death-row inmate.

2012/01/17/statement-of-governor-jack-markell-regarding-the-commutation-ofsentence-of-robert-gattis/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).

